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Abstract: In the field of computer security, a problem that received little attention so far is
the enforcement of confidentiality properties by supervisory control. Given a critical system G that
may leak confidential information, the problem consists in designing a controller C, possibly disabling
occurrences of a fixed subset of events of G, so that the closed-loop system G/C does not leak
confidential information. We consider this problem in the case where G is a finite transition system
with set of events Σ and an inquisitive user, called the adversary, observes a subset Σa of Σ. The
confidential information is the fact (when it is true) that the trace of the execution of G on Σ∗ belongs
to a regular set S ⊆ Σ∗, called the secret. The secret S is said to be opaque w.r.t. G (resp. G/C) and
Σa if the adversary cannot safely infer this fact from the trace of the execution of G (resp. G/C) on
Σ∗a. In the converse case, the secret can be disclosed. We present an effective algorithm for computing
the most permissive controller C such that S is opaque w.r.t. G/C and Σa. This algorithm subsumes
two earlier algorithms working under the strong assumption that the alphabet Σa of the adversary
and the set of events that the controller can disable are comparable.
Key-words: discrete event systems, control, security, confidentiality, opacity, partial observation
(Re´sume´ : tsvp)
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Controˆle par supervision de l’opacite´
Re´sume´ : Dans le domaine de la se´curite´ informatique, le proble`me de la synthe`se de controˆleurs
pour assurer des proprie´te´s de confidentialite´ a pour l’instant e´te´ tre`s peu e´tudie´. E´tant donne´ un
syste`me critique G, le proble`me consiste a` calculer automatiquement un controˆleur C de telle manie`re
qu’il n’y ait aucune fuite d’information dans G/C.
Nous conside´rons ce proble`me dans le cas ou` G est donne´ par un syste`me de transitions fini sur
un alphabet Σ, et un utilisateur, appele´ adversaire, qui observe seulement un sous-ensemble Σa de
Σ. L’information confidentielle est mode´lise´e par un langage re´gulier S ⊆ Σ∗, appele´ le secret. Le
secret S est dit opaque relativement a` G et Σa si l’adversaire ne peut infe´rer de manie`re certaine
que l’exe´cution courante de G appartient au secret en se fondant uniquement sur l’observation faite
relativement a` Σa. Nous pre´sentons un algorithme effectif permettant de calculer le controˆleur C le
plus permissif tel que S soit opaque relativement a` G/C et Σa. Cet algorithme e´tend des re´sultats
pre´ce´demment e´tablis : il n’est effet plus ne´cessaire de supposer que l’alphabet de l’adversaire Σa et
l’alphabet des e´ve´nements controˆlables sont comparables (au sens de l’inclusion).
Mots cle´s : Syste`mes a` e´ve´nements discrets, controˆle, se´curite´, confidentialite´, opacite´, observation
partielle
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1 Introduction
The development of infrastructures like the Internet or the mobile phone networks has led to the
emergence of sophisticated on-line services providing information access or decision taking facilities.
Such networks are open by nature and therefore vulnerable to malicious users. All the same, security
and confidence in security are essential to distant services such as e-voting, on-line payment, or medical
information storage. Such services handle indeed critical information that should be neither erased
nor corrupted nor leaked to unauthorized users. Confidence in the security of a service relies on and
requires some certification of security. Manual validation is expensive, may be impossible for large
systems, and is permeable to mistakes. The development of automatic tools serving to analyze or
to ensure the security of services has become crucial to discover and avoid security breaches. In this
context, there has been growing interest in the formal verification of security properties [13, 2, 10] and
in their model-based testing [20, 12, 6, 11, 8]1.
Security properties are generally classified into three different categories:
• availability (a user can always perform legal actions),
• integrity (a user can never perform illegal actions), and
• confidentiality (a user cannot discover or infer the secret information).
Consider the case of an e-voting system. Ensuring that the votes cannot be modified by a third party
is a concern of integrity. Ensuring that every elector can vote is a concern of availability. Ensuring
that is not possible for a third party to discover the vote of an elector is a concern of confidentiality.
In this paper, we focus on confidentiality and especially on opacity, a central notion that was
introduced in [14] and adapted to transition systems in [3]. Given a transition system, consider an
observation map that projects runs to observations, and a specific subset of runs called the secret,
with the meaning that the observed behavior of the system should never disclose when its actual
behavior belongs to this set. The secret is said to be opaque if the projection of every run in this set
coincides with the projection of some run outside the set. Then, an adversary who observes the run
of the system cannot safely infer from this (partial) observation that the run belongs to the secret.
More specific notions of opacity, like initial opacity or K-step opacity have been introduced in [19, 18].
At the same time, the notion of opacity defined in [14] is general enough to allow other notions like
anonymity (strong or weak as defined in [21]) and strong non-deterministic non-interference [9] to be
expressed as opacity for suitable secrets and observation maps [3]. Note that opacity is more or less
dual to diagnosability, that consists in deciding whether the actual run of the system belongs to the
secret from a bounded extension of this run.
Our purpose in this paper is not to model-check transition systems for opacity properties but to
enforce such properties on transition systems by supervisory control. According to Ramadge and
Wonham’s theory presented in [15, 16], the aim of supervisory control is to enforce a safety property
on a transition system. This is achieved by defining a map that determines after each incomplete run
of the system the set of actions which may be taken without compromising the safety property. All
uncontrollable actions must be in this set. This control map is generally expected to be as permissible
as possible, i.e. no unnecessary restriction should be imposed on the system. If successful termination
of runs is taken into account, the control map should moreover be non-blocking, meaning that it should
not prevent the system from eventually reaching some final state. Within Ramadge and Wonham’s
framework, the computational aspects of supervisory control have been investigated mainly for finite
transition systems and regular safety properties. In this case, the control map can be computed in a
regular form, yielding a finite state supervisor. The expected controlled system is then the product
G/C of the uncontrolled system G and supervisor C.
1Not not mention works on cryptography that fall out of the scope of this paper.
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Applying supervisory control to enforce confidentiality properties is an emerging field of research.
In [17], the author adapts the decentralized supervisory control theory in order to ensure the Chinese
Wall Policy, whereas in [5], the authors focus on (bisimulation-based) strong non-deterministic non-
interference properties. Attempts to adapt supervisory control to opacity have been made in [1] [22] [7].
In these works, one considers a finite and deterministic labeled transition system G over an alphabet
Σ, a regular set S ⊆ Σ∗ (the secret) and a subset Σa ⊆ Σ (the alphabet of the adversary), and one
searches for a finite state supervisor C enforcing the opacity of S w.r.t. the natural projection from
Σ∗ to Σ∗a (by the opacity of S we mean the opacity of the set of runs with traces in S). In this setting,
G represents a system running in the scope of an inquisitive adversary. The adversary observes all
actions in Σa and tries to infer from these partial observations the knowledge that the trace of the
run of G is in the secret set S.
One subtlety lays in the additional assumption that the adversary knows exactly the system G
and the supervisor C. This means that new confidential information may be inferred by the adversary
from the knowledge of C and the partial observation of the run of the controlled system, and to
avoid such leakage, one must iterate the controller construction. Hence the exact problem is to find a
supervisor C that enforces the opacity of S ∩L(G/C) w.r.t. the projection from Σ∗ to Σ∗a, and this is
an intrinsically circular problem because the control objective cannot be expressed without an explicit
reference to the controller (this is not true when the control objective is a safety property).
The non-blocking property of the supervisor (another circular problem) was ignored in the works
cited above. We shall not address this issue in the present paper, where we still consider finite
transition systems, regular secrets and natural projections.
The intrinsic circularity of the supervisory control problem for opacity makes it not possible to
give a general solution to this problem by direct application of Ramadge and Wonham’s methods 2.
These methods were designed for enforcing integrity properties on plants. Nevertheless, the Ramadge
and Wonham’s theory can be used directly for enforcing opacity properties when (1) Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σa
or (2) Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo where Σc resp. Σo denote the subsets of actions that can be controlled resp.
observed by the supervisor C [7]. In both cases, the language of the optimal supervisor C may be
computed by a first fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal sublanguage of L(G) in restriction to
which S is opaque, followed by a second fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal controllable and
normal sublanguage of the latter. Conditions less restrictive than (2) have been elaborated in [22] to
the same effect.
In the remaining situations, a non-trivial adaptation of Ramadge and Wonham’s methods is nec-
essary. Some of the difficulties encountered are described in [7] where a specific control synthesis
algorithm is defined for the case Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σ. The purpose of this paper is to propose a new
algorithm producing a most permissive and regular supervisory control for opacity in the more general
case where both Σc ⊆ Σo and Σa ⊆ Σo but Σc and Σa do not necessarily compare.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 fixes some notations and introduces
the notion of opacity as well as the opacity control problem. Section 3 provides a reduction of the
opacity control problem to the same problem under full observation. Section 4 presents informally the
constructions needed to synthesize the controller. Section 5 is the core of the paper and presents the
detailed construction and the formal justification of a solution to the opacity control problem. Section 6
presents a generalized framework in which the gist of the construction can be made apparent. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2By Ramadge and Wonham’s methods, we mean in general finite iterative methods for computing the greatest
fixpoints of contractive operators on regular languages, enforcing separately or jointly behavioral properties such as
safety, non-blockingness and the like by successive restrictions until these properties finally hold.
Irisa
Supervisory Control for Opacity 5
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and Definitions
Henceforth, Σ is a finite alphabet of actions (denoted σ, σi and the like), G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) is a deter-
ministic transition system labeled in Σ, with a finite set of states Q, an initial state q0 ∈ Q, and a
partial transition map δ : Q × Σ → Q. A (partial or incomplete) run ρ of G is a finite non-empty
sequence q0 σ1 q1 σ2 . . . qn−1 σn of alternated states qi ∈ Q and actions σi ∈ Σ such that δ(qi−1, σi) is
defined for i = 1 . . . n and it is equal to qi for i = 1 . . . n− 1.
The trace tr(ρ) of the run ρ is the word σ1σ2 . . . σn ∈ Σ
∗. The trace of the empty run q0 is
the empty word ε. The language of G is the set of all traces of runs of G and it is denoted L(G).
As G is a deterministic labeled transition system (or LTS), runs and traces of runs are in bijective
correspondence. The words in L(G) may therefore, by an abuse of terminology, be called traces of G.
Opacity control aims at preventing an inquisitive user, called the adversary, from obtaining or
inferring confidential information on the execution of G from a partial observation of this run. To
model the partial observation of runs by the adversary, we let Σa ⊆ Σ denote the subset of actions of
G that the adversary can observe, and we use the natural projection pia : Σ
∗ → Σ∗a defined inductively
on words with pia(ε) = ε, pia(σw) = σpia(w) if σ ∈ Σa, and pia(σw) = pia(w) otherwise. For any words
w,w′ ∈ Σ∗, w ∼a w′ denotes the fact that pia(w) = pia(w′), and [w]a = pi−1a ◦ pia(w) denotes the class
of w w.r.t. the induced equivalence. Thus, L(G) ∩ [w]a is the set of traces of G that the adversary
cannot distinguish from w. Deta(G) denotes the deterministic LTS which is computed from G by first
replacing all transitions labeled in Σ\Σa with ε-transitions and next applying the subset construction
to the relabeled version of G. The construction is recalled hereafter3.
Definition 1 Let G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) then Deta(G) = (X ,Σa,∆,X0) where X0 = δ(q0, [ε]a) and X ⊆ 2
Q
is the inductive closure of the set {X0} under the partial transition map ∆(X,σ) = δ(X, [σ]a).
In order to match the system G with the dynamic estimation of its current state by the adversary, we
shall consider the parallel composition G×Deta(G). This composition operation is recalled below.
Definition 2 Let Gi = (Qi,Σi, δi, qi,0) i=1,2 be two LTSs. Their parallel composition G1×G2 is the
deterministic transition system (Q1 ×Q2,Σ1 ∪Σ2, δ, (q1,0, q2,0)) as follows:
δ((q1, q2), σ) =


(δ1(q1, σ), δ2(q2, σ)) if σ ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2, δi(qi, σ) defined for i = 1, 2
(δ1(q1, σ), q2), if σ ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2, δ1(q1, σ) defined
(q1, δ2(q2, σ)), if σ ∈ Σ2 \ Σ1 δ2(q2, σ) defined
undefined, otherwise.
Note that a controlled system G/C might also be written G × C since G/C is indeed the parallel
composition of the plant G and the controller C.
2.2 The Definition of Opacity
Consider an LTS G over Σ and a subalphabet Σa ⊆ Σ. The alphabet Σa is the set of actions supplied
to the user for interacting synchronously with G, i.e. for observing the runs of G. One wants to hide
from the user some confidential property of runs, e.g. that a run has never visited some state, or that
some action σ has always been immediately followed in the run by some other action σ′, or that some
high-level action occurred in the run (according to the terminology for non-interference used in [9]).
3We use freely the inductive extension δ : Q×Σ∗ → Q defined with δ(q, ε) = q and δ(q, sσ) = δ(δ(q, s), σ) for σ ∈ Σ.
We use as well the additive extensions of δ to sets of states and/or to sets of words
PI n˚1921
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Figure 1: A case of non-opacity
Such a confidential property of runs may be represented abstractly as a non-empty and regular subset
S ⊆ L(G), which we call a secret. As the user is possibly inquisitive, we call him the adversary.
If, for some trace w of G, pia(w) belongs to pia(S) but does not belong to pia(L(G) \ S), then the
adversary knows from the observation pia(w) of the trace w that this trace belongs to S, i.e. the trace
w discloses the secret to the adversary. In the converse case, no confidential information is leaked and
the secret S is said to be opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa. Let us state a more precise definition of opacity.
Definition 3 For S′, L′ ⊆ Σ∗, let Discloser(S′, L′) be the set of words w ∈ L′ such that [w]a∩L
′ ⊆ S′,
then S′ is opaque w.r.t. L′ and Σa if Discloser(S
′, L′) = ∅.
Remark 1 Equivalently, S′ is opaque w.r.t. L′ and Σa iff (∀s ∈ L
′)(∃s′ ∈ L′ \ S′) s′ ∼a s.
Remark 2 If L is any family of languages and S is opaque w.r.t. L and Σa for any L ∈ L, then S
is opaque w.r.t. arbitrary unions of languages in L and Σa.
Example 1 Let G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, QS) be the automaton depicted in Figure 1, thus Q = {0, . . . , 8},
Σ = {b, c, x, y, z}, δ is defined by the labeled edges, q0 = 0, and S = {xb, yb, cz, cyb} (the traces in S
lead to the circled configurations in Figure 1). Let Σa = {b, x, y, z}. Then S is not opaque w.r.t. G and
Σa, since e.g. for the observation z, the only possible trace is c.z ∈ S. Similarly, for the observation
y.b, the only possible traces are y.b and c.y.b which both belong to the secret S. Finally, the trace x.b
belongs to S but it does not disclose the secret, since x.b ∼a c.x.b. and c.x.b. does not belong to S.
For another illustration of the concept of opacity, imagine that G models a hardware / software
system with a bug that cannot be fixed because it is in the hardware and S is the set of traces of all
runs in which the bug occurs, i.e. the secret S is the run-time extension of the bug. If S is opaque
w.r.t. L(G), then a user who can only observe the actions in Σa will never identify any consequence
of the bug. In the converse case, the best one can do is to hide the bug by wrapping G in a software
interface, restricting the behavior of G and ensuring in this way that S and hence the bug cannot be
disclosed any more. This can always be done in view of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 ([1]) Given a system G and a set of traces S, there always exists a supremal prefix-
closed sublanguage L′ of L(G) such that S is opaque w.r.t. L′ and Σa, namely the language L
′ =
L(G) \ ((L(G) \ pi−1a ◦ pia(L(G) \ S)).Σ
∗).
The proof of this proposition follows from the definition of opacity and Remark 2.
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2.3 The Opacity Control Problem
Given a system G and a secret S, our goal is to enforce the opacity of S on G by supervisory control.
The search space for possible controls over G is determined by two subsets of Σ, a subset Σc of
controllable actions and a subset Σo of observable actions. It is assumed that after a run of G with
trace w, the information available for controlling the next action of G is the observed trace pio(w),
where pio is the natural projection from Σ
∗ to Σ∗o. A control is a map f : Σ
∗
o → 2
Σ from observed
traces to subsets of Σ such that only the supersets of Σuc = Σ \ Σc can appear in the range of f
(this restriction reflects that a controller cannot ever disable any uncontrollable action). Applying the
control f to G means disabling after w all actions which do not belong to f(pio(w)). We let L(G/f)
denote the induced restriction of the language generated by G under the control f .
Remark 3 If C is a (possibly infinite) LTS such that L(C) = L(GΣ∗/f), where GΣ∗ is any LTS such
that L(GΣ∗) = Σ
∗, then L(G/f) = L(G × C). The LTS C is called a controller, and the parallel
composition G×C is often written G/C to stress this interpretation. Indeed, f and C determine each
other up to the constraint L(G/f) = L(G × C). So, one can work indifferently with control maps f
or with controllers C.
The problem we want to solve may be described roughly as follows.
Problem 1 Given a finite deterministic transition system G labeled over Σ, a regular subset S ⊆ Σ∗
(the secret), and three subalphabets Σa, Σo and Σc of Σ, compute a most permissive control f such
that S is opaque w.r.t. L(G/f) and Σa.
A classical Ramadge and Wonham’s theorem states that a prefix-closed sublanguageK of L(G) may be
obtained as the induced restriction of the language generated by G under some control f (in formulas,
K = L(G/f)) if and only if K is controllable and observable according to the definitions below (for a
complete presentation of supervisory control, the reader is referred e.g. to [4]).
Definition 4 A prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G) is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc if K.Σuc∩L(G) ⊆
K.
Definition 5 A prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G) is observable w.r.t. L(G), Σo and Σc if, for any
s, s′ ∈ K with identical observations pio(s) = pio(s
′) and for any controllable action σ ∈ Σc, (sσ ∈
L ∧ s′σ ∈ K)⇒ sσ ∈ K.
Another classical theorem states that if every controllable action is observable, i.e. in the case Σc ⊆ Σo,
then a prefix-closed language K is observable if and only it is normal according to the definition below.
Definition 6 A prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G) is normal w.r.t. L(G) and Σo if pi
−1
o ◦ pio(K) ∩
L(G) ⊆ K.
Prefix-closedness, controllability, and observability are preserved under arbitrary unions of languages.
Using this fact, one may show that under the assumption Σc ⊆ Σo, any language K has a supremal
prefix-closed, controllable and observable sublanguage. Using Remark 2, it should moreover be clear
that a formal solution to Problem 1 is obtained by defining L(G/f) as the union K† of all languages
K ⊆ L(G) such that K is prefix-closed, controllable and observable, and S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa.
Unfortunately, this does not indicate that f or L(G/f) can be effectively computed. It should moreover
be noted that, if the conditions stated above are fulfilled only for K = ∅ (the empty language that does
not even contain the empty word), then there exists no solution f to Problem 1 (because ε ∈ L(G/f)
for any f). The opacity of S w.r.t. L(G) ∩ Σ∗uc and Σa is a sufficient condition to the existence of
solutions to Problem 14. A list of alternative conditions under which effective algorithms have been
proposed for computing the most permissive opacity control is stated in the following proposition.
4This condition is not necessary. For instance, let L(G) = ε + (x+ c)(a + ε) and S = xa with Σa = {a}, Σc = {c},
and Σ0 = {x, c}, then S is not opaque w.r.t. L(G) ∩ Σ
∗
uc but it is opaque w.r.t. L(G)!
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Proposition 2 Given a system G and a secret S, assume that S is opaque w.r.t. L(G) ∩ Σ∗uc and
Σa. In each of the following four situations, one can effectively compute the most permissive control
f enforcing the opacity of S w.r.t. L(G/f) and Σa:
(1) Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ [7],
(2) Σo = Σ and (∀s, s
′ ∈ L(G))(∀σ ∈ Σuc ∩ Σa) s ∼a s
′ ∧ sσ ∈ L(G)⇒ s′σ ∈ L(G) [22]
(3) Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σ [7],
(4) Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σ [7]
In cases (1), (2) and (3), L(G/f) is obtained by computing first the supremal sublanguage SupOp(L(G))
of L(G) with respect to which S is opaque (given by Proposition 1), and next the supremal controllable
and normal sublanguage SupCoNo(SupOp(L(G)) of the former. In case (4), it would be necessary to
iterate further the two operations SupOp and SupCoNo in alternation, but it has been shown in [7]
that such an iteration may not stabilize, and a non-trivial adaptation of Ramadge and Wonham’s
methods was in fact necessary to compute L(G/f) with an algorithm that always terminates.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that Σc ⊆ Σo as in all cases listed in Proposition 2. We also
suppose that Σa ⊆ Σo, meaning that a controller has at least as precise information as the adversary
on the actual run of G. But we do not suppose that Σc and Σa are comparable, thus jointly extending
conditions (3) and (4) of Proposition 2. The exact problem which we want to solve may finally be
stated as follows:
Problem 2 (Opacity Control Problem) Let a finite deterministic transition system G labeled over
Σ, a regular subset S ⊆ Σ∗ (the secret), a subalphabet Σo ⊆ Σ (the actions which a controller can
observe), and two arbitrary subalphabets Σc ⊆ Σo (the actions which a controller can disable) and
Σa ⊆ Σo (the actions visible to the adversary). Let K denote the set of non-empty prefix-closed sub-
languages K of L(G) such that K is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc, K is normal w.r.t. L(G) and
Σo, and S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa. The problem is twofold.
i) Show that it is decidable whether K is empty.
ii) Show that for non-empty K, the union ∪K of all languages in K is a regular language K†, and
construct from G and S a finite state machine generating K†.
3 A reduction to opacity control under full observation
We show in this section that solving the Opacity Control Problem under the assumption Σ = Σo (full
observation) induces a general solution of the Opacity Control Problem. The parameter Σo of the
Opacity Control Problem will therefore be eliminated from the subsequent sections where the problem
is afforded a solution.
Define F(Σ, L(G), S,Σc,Σo,Σa) = K (the set specified in the statement of the Opacity Control
Problem). Let K′ = F(Σo, pio(L(G)), S
′,Σc,Σo,Σa) where S
′ = pio(S) \ pio(L(G) \ S). Note that
S′ ⊆ pio(S), and S
′ is a regular language.
Proposition 3 Let K ∈ K, then pio(K) ∈ K
′.
Proof K ⊆ L(G) ⇒ pio(K) ⊆ pio(L(G)), and the non-emptiness and prefix-closeness of K entail
similar properties for pio(K).
We show that pio(K) is controllable w.r.t. pio(L(G)) and Σc. Let w
′ ∈ pio(K) and σ ∈ Σo \ Σc
such that w′σ ∈ pio(L(G)). As L(G) is prefix-closed, w
′ = pio(w) for some w ∈ L(G) such that
wσ ∈ L(G). Let w′ = pio(v) for some v ∈ K. Then pio(v) = pio(w). As K is normal w.r.t. L(G)
Irisa
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and Σo, w ∈ L(G) ∧ v ∈ K ⇒ w ∈ K. As wσ ∈ L(G) and σ /∈ Σc, wσ ∈ K by controllability of K.
Therefore, w′σ ∈ pio(K) as required.
The projected language pio(K) is certainly normal w.r.t. pio(L(G)) and Σo, because pio(K) ⊆
pio(L(G)) ⊆ Σ
∗
o.
We show finally that S′ is opaque w.r.t. pio(K) and Σa. Let w
′ ∈ S′ ∩ pio(K), then w
′ = pio(w) for
some w ∈ K ⊆ L(G) and by definition of S′, w ∈ S. As S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa, pia(w) = pia(v)
for some v ∈ K \ S. Let v′ = pio(v), then pia(w
′) = pia(w) = pia(v) = pia(v
′), v′ ∈ pio(K), and v
′ /∈ S′
because v ∈ pi−1o (v
′), v ∈ K ⊆ L(G), and v /∈ S. ⋄
Proposition 4 Let K ′ ∈ K′, then pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G) ∈ K.
Proof Let K = pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G), then K ⊆ L(G), K is prefix-closed because K ′ and L(G) are
prefix-closed, and K 6= ∅ because K ′ is a non-empty subset of pio(L(G)).
We show that K is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc. Let wσ ∈ L(G) with w ∈ K and σ ∈ Σ \ Σc.
If σ /∈ Σo, then wσ ∈ K because pio(wσ) = pio(w) ∈ K
′. Suppose now that σ ∈ Σo. Then w
′ = pio(w)
belongs to K ′, σ ∈ Σo \ Σc, and w
′σ ∈ pio(L(G)). As K
′ is controllable w.r.t. pio(L(G)) and Σc,
w′σ ∈ K ′. Therefore, wσ ∈ pi−1o (K
′), and since wσ ∈ L(G), wσ ∈ K as required.
It follows directly from the definition K = pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G) that K is normal w.r.t. L(G) and Σo.
We show finally that S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa. Let w ∈ S ∩ K and let w
′ = pio(w), then
w′ ∈ K ′, hence pi−1o (w
′) ∩ L(G) ⊆ K. If pi−1o (w
′) ∩ L(G) is not included in S, then pio(v) = pio(w)
and thus pia(v) = pia(w) for some v ∈ pi
−1
o (w
′) ∩ (K \ S). If pi−1o (w
′) ∩ L(G) is included in S, then
w′ ∈ S′ by definition of this set. As S′ is opaque w.r.t. K ′ and Σa, pia(w
′) = pia(v
′) for some
v′ ∈ K ′ \ S′. By definition of S′, v′ = pio(v) for some v ∈ L(G) \ S. Now v ∈ pi
−1
o (v
′) and v′ ∈ K ′,
hence pi−1o (v
′) ∩ L(G) ⊆ K by definition of K. Therefore, v ∈ K \ S. Finally, pia(v) = pia(w) because
pia(w) = pia(w
′) and pia(v) = pia(v
′). ⋄
Proposition 5 The Opacity Control Problem with the parameters (Σ, L(G), S,Σc,Σo,Σa) is equiva-
lent to the same problem with the parameters (Σo, pio(L(G)), S
′,Σc,Σo,Σa).
Proof In view of Propositions 3 and 4, K 6= ∅ if and only if K′ 6= ∅. Note that both operations
pio(·) : K → K
′ and pi−1o (·) ∩ L(G) : K
′ → K are monotone. Moreover, the following relations hold for
all K ∈ K and K ′ ∈ K′ (establishing thus a Galois connection between K and K′):
• pio(K) ⊆ K
′ ⇒ K ⊆ pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G)
• K ⊆ pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G)⇒ pio(K) ⊆ K
′
• K ⊆ pi−1o ◦ pio(K) ∩ L(G)
• K ′ = pio(pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G))
One deduces the following. If ∪K = K† ∈ K then for any K ′ ∈ K′, pi−1o (K
′) ∩ L(G) ⊆ K† ⊆
pi−1o ◦ pio(K
†) ∩ L(G), hence pio(pi
−1
o (K
′) ∩ L(G)) = K ′ ⊆ pio(K
†). If ∪K′ = K ′ † ∈ K′ then for any
K ∈ K, pio(K) ⊆ (K
′ †), hence K ⊆ pi−1o (K
′ †)∩L(G). Thus, ∪K ∈ K if and only if ∪K′ ∈ K′. As both
operators pio(·) and pi
−1
o (·) ∩ L(G) preserve regular languages, the proof of the proposition follows. ⋄
Based on Proposition 5, whenever Σa ⊆ Σo ⊆ Σ, one can reformulate the opacity control problem
in terms of the abstract system induced by the observation map pio and a new secret S
′ derived from
S, solve the problem in this abstract setting, and lift up the solution K ′ † to the original setting as
K † = pi−1o (K
′ †) ∩ L(G).
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4 An informal presentation of the constructions
In this section, we sketch the intuitions under the methods that will be employed for solving Problem 2.
Henceforth, based on Proposition 5, we assume w.l.o.g. that Σ = Σo. Moreover, we assume that the
transition system G recognizes the secret S, i.e. G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, QS) such that for any s ∈ S
∗,
s ∈ L(G) iff δ(q0, s) is defined and s ∈ S iff δ(q0, s) ∈ QS . This second condition, even though it
does not hold for arbitrary G and S, always holds for the parallel composition of G and a complete
deterministic automaton recognizing S.
Let K denote the set of all non-empty prefix-closed and controllable languages K ⊆ L(G) such
that S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa. It was observed in Section 2 that, if K differs from the empty set,
then K† = ∪K is in K. We want to construct a finite automaton A† that generates K†, showing that
this language is regular and providing as a by-product the most permissive control f † enforcing the
opacity of S w.r.t. L(G)/f † and Σa. In case when K
† = ∅, no control f on G can enforce the opacity
of S. In order to avoid this special case, we assume henceforth that q0 /∈ QS and δ(q0, σ) is defined
only for σ ∈ (Σc ∩ Σa). This property may always be enforced on G by adding if necessary a dummy
transition from a dummy initial state to the actual initial state of G. In this way, the condition K† 6= ∅
is replaced equivalently with the condition K† 6= {ε}. The latter condition may of course be decided
upon from any automaton A† generating K†.
As S is the set of traces of G recognized by the accepting states in QS , a trace s ∈ Σ
∗ discloses
the secret S to the adversary if δ(q0, [s]a) ⊆ QS. Therefore, K
† = L(G) if δ(q0, [s]a) 6⊆ QS for
every s ∈ S. The usual method for testing this is to construct an LTS Deta(G) = (X ,Σa,∆,X0) as
indicated in Definition 1, and to check that no reachable state X ∈ X is a subset of QS . In case when
X ⊆ QS for some X ∈ X , a first and necessary step towards computing K
† is to compute the LTS
A = G ×Deta(G), thus matching the system G with the dynamic estimation of its current state by
the adversary. This LTS, equipped with the set of accepting states Q × 2QS , recognizes exactly the
set of traces which disclose the secret S.
Let us explain more precisely the contribution brought by the LTS A to the construction of a
control map f enforcing the opacity of S. Define Σua = Σ \ Σa. The initial state of A is the pair
(q0, E0) defined with E0 = δ(q0,Σ
∗
ua), and the reachability set of A is the inductive closure of the set
{(q0, E0)} under the partial transition map δ((q,E), σ) = (δ(q, σ), δ(E,Σ
∗
uaσΣ
∗
ua)) (where E ⊆ Q).
When a run with trace s is performed in G, the matching run of A leads to a pair (q,E) where q is the
state reached by G and E = δ(q0, [s]a) is the most accurate estimate of q that can be computed by an
adversary knowing G and pia(s). Therefore, the adversary can disclose the secret if and only if A has
at least one loosing path, that is a path leading to a loosing configuration (q,E) such that E ⊆ QS .
Suppose the adversary can win. One must impose on G some control f such that, for any s in L(G)
and for any action σc ∈ Σc, if s ∈ L(G/f) and δ((q0, E0), sσcu) is a loosing configuration of A for some
u ∈ Σ∗uc, then σc /∈ f(s). Traces s ∈ L(G) are fully observable, hence the corresponding configurations
δ((q0, E0), s) of A may be used to determine the values of f(s). It suffices indeed to track controllable
actions σc backwards from loosing configurations on acyclic paths of A, and to define f such that the
last controllable transition is disabled on each loosing path. Then, no loosing configuration of A can
be reached in A/f , and by construction, L(G/f) = L(A/f) is a superset of K†.
However, L(A/f) may be larger than K†, because the configuration δ((q0, E0), s) = (q,E) reached
in A/f by a trace s ∈ L(G/f) does not always reflect the most accurate estimate of q = δ(q0, s) for
an adversary knowing G, f and pia(s). As L(G/f) is strictly smaller than L(G), E may indeed be
strictly larger than δ(q0, [s]a ∩ L(G/f)), and if this smaller set is included in QS , then the adversary
can still disclose the secret S in the controlled system G/f .
At this stage, it would be helpful to compute an automaton A′ generating L(G/f) such that each
trace s ∈ L(G/f) leads from the initial state of A′ to the configuration (q,E) given by q = δ(q0, s) and
E = δ(q0, [s]a ∩ L(G/f))
5. Unfortunately, such an automaton does generally not exist. One reason
5This was the construction used in [7] to deal with case (4) in Proposition 1.
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Figure 2: Deta(G) and A = G×Deta(G)
among others is that two traces s, s′ ∈ L(G/f) inducing different control values f(s) and f(s′) might
nevertheless lead to the same configuration (q,E), thus preventing A′ from generating L(G/f).
Example 2 To illustrate this point, consider again the system G and the secret S defined in Exam-
ple 1. Assume now that Σa = {b, x, y, z} and Σc = {b, c}. The LTSsDeta(G) and A = G×Deta(G) are
shown on Figure 2. The loosing configurations that disclose S are squared. The control f must disable
the last controllable transition on each loosing path as indicated in dashed lines, hence f(ε) = {x, y},
f(x) = {b}, and f(y) = ∅. In particular, x, y ∈ L(G/f) and f(x) 6= f(y). However, an adversary
who knows that G is controlled by f computes the same state estimate {1} for δ(0, x) and δ(0, y).
Now, if one lets accordingly δ((0, {0}), x) = (1, {1}) = δ((0, {0}), y) in A′, then one reaches a confused
situation: on the one hand, δ((1, {1}), b) should be defined because b ∈ f(x), and on the other hand,
δ((1, {1}), b) should be undefined because b /∈ f(y)!
All the more, constructing f from A in a first stage and A′ from f and A in a second stage, if this was
possible, would make the computation of f † very slow as we explain now. Given a trace s ∈ L(G/f)
with δ((q0, E0), s) = (q,E), suppose that δ(q0, [s]a ∩ L(G/f)) = E
′ such that E′ ⊂ E and (q,E′) is
not a configuration of A. Suppose that from every state q′ ∈ E′, exists in G exactly one transition
δ(q′, σ) = qS where qS ∈ QS and all the transitions from states q
′ ∈ E′ are labeled with the same
action σ ∈ (Σa∩Σc). Although it was already patent from G (as opposed to G/f) that, if an adversary
ever gets the estimate E′ of q = δ(q, s), then the action σ must be control-disabled after s, this fact
is ignored in the definition of the control f since (q,E′) is not a configuration of A.
Example 3 Back to example 2, one may see that if, after control f is imposed on G, the configuration
(1, {1}) may be reached in G/f , then the secret will be disclosed by the trace x.b in the controlled
system G/f . It is thus ultimately necessary to disable b at configuration (1, {1}) (which solves at the
same time the confusion encountered in Example 2).
In order to cope with these shortcomings, we will replace automata defined over subsets of Q× 2Q
with partial maps d : Q× 2Q × Σ → Q such that d(q,E, σ) = δ(q, σ) or it is undefined. Each partial
map d generates a corresponding automaton with the initial state (q0, {q0}). The reachability set of the
generated automaton is the inductive closure of the set {(q0, {q0})} under the partial transition map
δd : (Q× 2
Q)×Σ→ (Q× 2Q) defined from d as follows. Let d : Q× 2Q×Σ∗uaΣ be defined inductively
with d(q,E, σs) = d(d(q,E, σ), E, s) for σ ∈ Σua. Let d denote also the additive extension of the latter
map to sets of states and to languages. We define δd((q,E), σ) = (q
′, E′) with q′ = d(q,E, σ), E′ = E
if σ /∈ Σa, and E
′ = d(E,E,Σ∗uaσ) otherwise.
Consider e.g. the automaton A = G × Deta(G). We will replace this automaton with the par-
tial transition map d0 defined with d0(q,E, σ) = δ(q, σ). The map d0 generates from (q0, {q0}) an
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automaton A0 isomorphic to A. The isomorphism maps each state (δ(q0, s), δ(q0, [s]a)) of A to a
similar state (δ(q0, s), E) where the condensed state estimate E is equal to {q0} if [s]a = [ε]a and oth-
erwise to δ(q0, [s]a ∩Σ
∗Σa). Note that the map d0 may also serve to generate sequences of transitions
(qi, Ei)
σi−→ (qi+1, Ei+1) from initial configurations (q,E) that cannot be reached in A but may play a
role later on during the iterative computation of the optimal control.
Continuing to mimic the approach in which a first control function f was derived from A, we will
replace the computation of f by the computation of a partial map d1 : Q × 2
Q × Σ → Q, such that
d1(q,E, σ) will be either equal to d0(q,E, σ) or undefined. The latter case will occur whenever σ is
controllable and the configuration (q′, E′) = δd0((q,E), σ) discloses the secret, i.e. when all states
reached in G by firing sequences in Σ∗ua from states in E
′ are in QS . The automaton generated by the
map d1 from {(q0, {q0})} can now play the role that we had assigned to our ghost automaton A
′.
Proceeding similarly from d1, we will construct an inductive sequence of partial maps di+1 = φ(di)
such that di+1(q,E, σ) = di(q,E, σ) or it is undefined. These maps induce a corresponding sequence
of finite automata Ai, generated from {(q0, {q0})}, with decreasing languages L(Ai) ⊇ L(Ai+1). As
there exist finitely many partial maps from Q×2Q×Σ to Q, the decreasing sequence (di)i∈N stabilizes,
i.e. dn = φ(dn) for some n. We will prove that L(An) = K
†, which shows that the most permissive
control f † enforcing the opacity of S is regular6.
We would like to complete this informal presentation of the results and constructions stated in
Section 5 by explaining a little more the intuitions under state estimates E in pairs (q,E) ∈ Q× 2Q.
In such pairs, E is best envisaged as the set of states that an adversary feels G may have reached
immediately after the last action σ ∈ Σa he has observed in some trace wσ of G with partially observed
prefix w. If the adversary moreover knows that the control imposed on G after his last observed action
in Σa agrees with di, i.e. that G behaves according to the sequences of transitions defined by δdi from
the configuration (q,E), then the estimate E provides him enough information to determine all states
that might have been reached in G under the same control by executing arbitrary traces w′σs such
that w ∼a w
′ and s ∈ Σ∗ua. The reason why we have chosen to work with condensed state estimates is
that this facilitates greatly the construction of the partial transition map δd from the control map d.
If dn = φ(dn), then for any s ∈ L(G/f
†), the state estimate E in δdn((q0, {q0}), s) = (q,E) is indeed
the set of states that an adversary believes G may have reached under the control f † after the last
action σ ∈ Σa in the trace s.
5 The Technical Development
Let G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, QS) with q0 /∈ QS and δ(q0, σ) undefined for σ ∈ Σ \ (Σa ∩ Σc), L(G) = {s ∈
Σ∗ | δ(q0, s) defined} and S = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | δ(q0, s) ∈ QS}. Throughout the section, d : Q× 2
Q × Σ → Q
denotes a partial map such that d(q,E, σ) is either equal to δ(q, σ) or undefined. Let us recall the
following.
Definition 7 Given d : Q × 2Q × Σ → Q, define inductively d(q,E, ε) = q and d(q,E, σs) =
d(d(q,E, σ), E, s) for σ ∈ Σua and s 6= ε. Let δd : (Q × 2
Q) × Σ → (Q × 2Q) be the partial
transition map on Q × 2Q such that δd((q,E), σ) = (q
′, E′) is given by q′ = d(q,E, σ), E′ = E if
σ /∈ Σa, and E
′ = d(E,E,Σ∗uaσ) otherwise. For s ∈ Σ
∗, define inductively δd((q,E), ε) = (q,E) and
δd((q,E), sσ) = δd(δd((q,E), s), σ). Let A(d) denote the automaton which is generated by the partial
transition map δd from the initial state (q0, {q0}). Thus A(d) = (Θd,Σ, δd, (q0, {q0})) where Θd is the
closure of the set {(q0, {q0})} under δd. Finally let L(d) = L(A(d)).
Remark 4 L(d) ⊆ L(G) by definition of δd.
6We recall that K† is always non-empty owing to the assumptions made in the beginning of this section.
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Remark 5 If d′ ⊆ d in the sense that d(q,E, σ) is defined and equal to d′(q,E, σ) whenever the latter
is defined, then for any s ∈ Σ∗, δd′((q,E), s) = (q
′, E′) entails that δd((q,E), s) = (q
′, E′′) for some
E′′ ⊇ E′. Therefore, d′ ⊆ d ⇒ L(d′) ⊆ L(d).
Throughout the section, we let θ = (q˜, E˜) ∈ Q × 2Q such that q˜ ∈ d(E˜, E˜,Σ∗ua). The following
three lemmas show that if a sequence of transitions (qi, Ei)
σi−→ (qi+1, Ei+1), i = 1 . . . n, is generated from
(q1, E1) = (q˜, E˜) using the transition map δd, then for each i, d(Ei+1, Ei+1,Σ
∗
ua) is the best estimate
of the state qi = δ(q˜, σ1 . . . σi) that the adversary can obtain from pia(σ1 . . . σi) and the knowledge that
q˜ ∈ d(E˜, E˜,Σ∗ua).
Lemma 1 Let δd(θ, s) = (q,E) and δd(θ, s
′) = (q′, E′), then pia(s) = pia(s
′)⇒ E = E′.
Proof We use an induction on the length of pia(s). If this length is zero, i.e. s, s
′ ∈ Σ∗ua, then
E = E˜ and E′ = E˜ by Definition 7, hence E = E′. Assume now that the lemma holds when pia(s)
has length n, and consider s, s′ ∈ Σ∗ with pia(s) = pia(s
′) ∈ Σn+1a . Let s = s1σas2 and s
′ = s′1σas
′
2
such that pia(s1) = pia(s
′
1) ∈ Σ
n
a and σa ∈ Σa, hence s2, s
′
2 ∈ Σ
∗
ua. By the induction hypothesis, if we
let δd(θ, s1) = (q1, E1) and δd(θ, s
′
1) = (q
′
1, E
′
1), then E1 = E
′
1. By Definition 7, if we let δd(θ, s1σa) =
(q2, E2) and δd(θ, s
′
1σa) = (q
′
2, E
′
2) then E2 = d(E1, E1,Σ
∗
uaσa) and E
′
2 = d(E
′
1, E
′
1,Σ
∗
uaσa), hence
E2 = E
′
2. Now (q,E) = δd((q2, E2), s2) and (q
′, E′) = δd((q
′
2, E
′
2), s
′
2). As s2, s
′
2 ∈ Σ
∗
ua, by Definition 7,
E = E2 and E
′ = E′2, hence E = E
′. ⋄
Lemma 2 δd(θ, s) = (q,E) ⇒ q ∈ d(E,E,Σ
∗
ua).
Proof If s = ε, then δd(θ, s) = θ and the property to show coincides with the assumed property
of θ. If s = s′σ with σ ∈ Σ, let δd(θ, s
′) = (q′, E′). One may assume by induction on words that
q′ ∈ d(E′, E′,Σ∗ua), thus q
′ = d(q′′, E′, s′′) for some q′′ ∈ E′ and s′′ ∈ Σ∗ua. Then q = d(q
′, E′, σ) =
d(d(q′′, E′, s′′), E′, σ) = d(q′′, E′, s′′σ) ∈ d(E′, E′,Σ∗uaσ). One proceeds by cases. Suppose that σ /∈ Σa,
then δd((q
′, E′), σ) = (q,E) entails E = E′ and the desired result follows from q ∈ d(E′, E′,Σ∗ua).
Suppose that σ ∈ Σa, then δd((q
′, E′), σ) = (q,E) entails E = d(E′, E′,Σ∗uaσ) and therefore q ∈ E.
The desired result follows from E ⊆ d(E,E,Σ∗ua). ⋄
Lemma 3 Let q˜ = q0 and E˜ = {q0}, then δd(θ, s) = (q,E) and q
′ ∈ d(E,E,Σ∗ua) jointly entail
δd(θ, s
′) = (q′, E) for some s′ such that pia(s) = pia(s
′).
Proof We use an induction on the length of pia(s). Let pia(s) have length zero. By Definition 7,
E = E˜, hence q′ = d(q0, {q0}, s
′) for some s′ ∈ Σ∗ua, and pia(s) = pia(s
′). By Definition 7, δd(θ, s
′) =
(d(q0, {q0}, s
′), {q0}) = (q
′, E) as desired. Assume now that the proposition holds when pia(s) has
length n, and consider s ∈ Σ∗ with pia(s) ∈ Σ
n+1
a . Let s = s1σas2 such that pia(s1) ∈ Σ
n
a and σa ∈ Σa,
hence s2 ∈ Σ
∗
ua. Let δd(θ, s1) = (q1, E1). By Definition 7, E = d(E1, E1,Σ
∗
uaσa). As q
′ ∈ d(E,E,Σ∗ua),
q′ = d(q′2, E, s
′
2) for some q
′
2 ∈ E and s
′
2 ∈ Σ
∗
ua. As E = d(E1, E1,Σ
∗
uaσa), q
′
2 = d(q
′
1, E1, s
′′
2σa) for some
q′1 ∈ E1 and s
′′
2 ∈ Σ
∗
ua. As pia(s1) has length n, the induction hypothesis applies to δd(θ, s1) = (q1, E1)
and to q′1 ∈ E1 ⊆ d(E1, E1,Σ
∗
ua). Therefore, δd(θ, s
′
1) = (q
′
1, E1) for some s
′
1 such that pia(s1) = pia(s
′
1).
Now δd(θ, s
′
1s
′′
2σa) = (q
′
2, d(E1, E1,Σ
∗
uaσa)) = (q
′
2, E), hence δd(θ, s
′
1s
′′
2σas
′
2) = (q
′, E), establishing the
lemma. ⋄
We will now investigate which words in L(d) actually disclose the secret S to the adversary, and
how one can remedy these security failures. First, let us throw in a definition.
Definition 8 Given a partial map d : Q×2Q×Σ→ Q, let LE(d) = {E ⊆ Q |E 6= ∅ ∧ d(E,E,Σ∗ua) ⊆
QS} be the associated set of loosing estimates, and for any θ = (q˜, E˜) in Q × 2
Q such that q˜ ∈
d(E˜, E˜,Σ∗ua), let LT (d, θ) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | δd(θ, s) ∈ Q× LE(d)} be the set of loosing traces w.r.t. state q˜
of G, adversary’s state estimate E˜ and control d.
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The subset of words in L(d) that disclose the secret may now be recognized by the automaton
A(d) (see Definition 7) equipped with the set of accepting states Q×LE(d), as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 For any s ∈ L(d), [s]a ∩ L(d) ⊆ S iff δd((q0, {q0}), s) ∈ Q× LE(d).
Proof Let s ∈ L(d) such that [s]a∩L(d) ⊆ S. Let δd((q0, {q0}), s) = (q,E), and let q
′ ∈ d(E,E,Σ∗ua).
By Lemma 3, (q′, E) = δd((q0, {q0}), s
′) for some s′ ∈ [s]a. As s
′ ∈ [s]a and s
′ ∈ L(d), we have
s′ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(d) ⊆ S. As δ(q0, s
′) = q′, it follows that q′ ∈ QS . Therefore, E ∈ LE(d). To show
the converse implication, let δd((q0, {q0}), s) = (q,E) ∈ Q × LE(d), hence d(E,E,Σ
∗
ua) ⊆ QS . By
Lemma 1, for any s′ ∈ [s]a ∩L(d), if we let q
′ = δ(q0, s
′) then δd((q0, {q0}), s
′) = (q′, E). By Lemma 2,
q′ ∈ d(E,E,Σ∗ua) ⊆ QS . Therefore, [s]a ∩ L(d) ⊆ S. ⋄
Proposition 7 If θ = δd((q0, {q0}), s˜), then LT (d, θ) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | s˜s ∈ L(d) ∧ [s˜s]a ∩ L(d) ⊆ S}.
Proof Let s ∈ LT (d, θ), then by definition, δd((q0, {q0}), s˜s) = (q,E) with E ∈ LE(d). By Proposi-
tion 6, [s˜s]a ∩L(d) ⊆ S. To prove the converse inclusion relation, consider s ∈ Σ
∗ such that s˜s ∈ L(d)
and [s˜s]a ∩L(d) ⊆ S. Let δd((q0, {q0}), s˜s) = (q,E). By Proposition 6, δd((q0, {q0}), s˜s) ∈ Q×LE(d),
hence E ∈ LE(d). Now δd((q0, {q0}), s˜s) = δd(θ, s), hence s ∈ LT (d, θ). ⋄
Proposition 7 tells us that, if θ = (q˜, E˜) = δd((q0, {q0}), s˜) for some trace s˜ ∈ L(G) and some
partial map d : Q× 2Q ×Σ→ Q, then for any s ∈ LT (d, θ), if an adversary gets the state estimate E˜
immediately after the trace s˜ has been executed in G × A(d), then he can infer from the projection
pia(s) of the subsequent trace s executed in G×A(d) that s˜s is in the secret set S. More generally, even
though the configuration (d, θ) may not be reachable in A(d), if s ∈ LT (d, θ) and θ = δd′((q0, {q0}), s˜)
for some d′ ⊆ d and s˜ ∈ Σ∗, then s ∈ LT (d′, θ). The reasons why things should be so have been
explained and illustrated in Section 4.
Based on Proposition 7, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 1 If LT (d, θ) = ∅ for every configuration θ = δd((q0, {q0}), s˜) reached in A(d), then
Discloser(S,L(d)) = ∅, i.e. S is opaque w.r.t. L(d) and Σa.
We have now in hands all elements needed to compute d † : Q×2Q×Σ→ Q such thatDiscloser(S,L(d†)) =
∅ and L(d†) = K† is the largest controllable sublanguage of L(G) with this property.
Definition 9 Given d : Q × 2Q × Σ → Q, let φ(d) ⊆ d be the partial map such that φ(d)(q,E, σ)
is undefined if σ ∈ Σc and LT (d, θ) ∩ Σ
∗
uc 6= ∅ for θ = δd((q,E), σ), and φ(d)(q,E, σ) = d(q,E, σ)
otherwise.
It is important to note that the emptiness of the set LT (d, θ) ∩ Σ∗uc may be checked on the finite
automaton generated by the partial transition map δd from the initial state θ = (q˜, E˜).
Definition 10 Let d † = dn for the least n such that dn+1 = dn where di+1 = φ(di) and d0 : Q× 2
Q×
Σ→ Q is the map defined with d0(q,E, σ) = δ(q, σ).
The partial map d † is well defined since φ(d) ⊆ d for all d and there exist finitely many partial maps
d : Q × 2Q × Σ → Q. Note that L(d0) = L(G). It may be shown by an induction on i that L(di) is
a controllable sublanguage of L(G), since by Definition 9, if s ∈ L(d) \ L(φ(d)) and s′ is the longest
prefix of s in L(φ(d)), then s = s′σcs
′′ for some action σc ∈ Σc.
The following propositions show that the language K† = L(d†) is the largest controllable sublan-
guage of L(G) such that S is opaque w.r.t. K† and Σa.
Irisa
Supervisory Control for Opacity 15
Proposition 8 S is opaque w.r.t. K† and Σa.
Proof Let dn = φ(dn), hence K
† = L(dn). Assume for contradiction that S is not opaque w.r.t.
L(dn) and Σa. Then there exists s ∈ L(dn) such that [s]a ∩ L(dn) ⊆ S. By Proposition 6, s ∈
LT (dn, (q0, {q0})). We claim that s ∈ Σ
∗
uc. In order to establish this property, assume for contradiction
that s = s1σs2 with σ ∈ Σc and s2 ∈ Σ
∗
uc. Let δdn((q0, {q0}), s1) = (q1, E1) and δdn((q1, E1), σ) =
(q2, E2), then by Proposition 7, s2 ∈ LT (dn, (q2, E2)). As s2 ∈ Σ
∗
uc, by Definition 9, φ(dn)(q1, E1, σ) is
undefined. As dn(q1, E1, σ) = q2, it is impossible that dn = φ(dn). It follows from this contradiction
that s ∈ Σ∗uc. Recalling that L(dn) ⊆ L(G), we observe now that necessarily s = ε, because s ∈ Σ
∗
uc
and δ(q0, σ) is undefined for all σ ∈ Σuc. Now [ε]a∩L(dn) 6⊆ S since it has been assumed that q0 /∈ QS ,
hence it is impossible that [s]a∩L(dn) ⊆ S. It follows from this second contradiction that S is opaque
w.r.t. L(dn) and Σa. ⋄
Proposition 9 Let K be any prefix-closed and controllable sublanguage of L(G) such that S is opaque
w.r.t. K and Σa. Then K ⊆ L(di) for all i.
Proof In order to establish the proposition, we assume that K 6⊆ L(di) for some i and we search
for a contradiction. As L(di) ⊇ L(di+1) for all i, we can moreover assume that i is the least integer
such that K 6⊆ L(di). As L(G) = L(d0), we have i 6= 0. Let s be a minimal word w.r.t. the prefix
order in K \ L(di). As L(di) is prefix-closed, s 6= ε. Let s = s
′σ with σ ∈ Σ. As s has no strict
prefix in K \ L(di), necessarily s
′ ∈ K ∩ L(di). Thus, s
′ ∈ L(di), s
′σ /∈ L(di), and s
′σ ∈ L(di−1) since
s′σ = s ∈ K ⊆ L(di−1). By construction of the map di = φ(di−1), σ ∈ Σc and LT (di−1, θ) ∩ Σ
∗
uc 6= ∅
for θ = δdi−1((q0, {q0}), s
′σ). By Proposition 7, there exists s′′ ∈ Σ∗uc such that s
′σs′′ ∈ L(di−1)
and [s′σs′′]a ∩ L(di−1) is included in S. Now s = s
′σ is in K, s′σs′′ is in L(G) because L(di−1) ⊆
L(G), and s′′ ∈ Σ∗uc. As K is a controllable sublanguage of L(G), it follows that s
′σs′′ is in K. As
[s′σs′′]a ∩ L(di−1) ⊆ S and K ⊆ L(di−1) by assumption on i, [s
′σs′′]a ∩ K is included in S. This
contradicts the hypothesis that S is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa. Therefore, the proposition has been
established. ⋄
Theorem 1 K† = L(d †) is the largest prefix-closed and controllable sublanguage of L(G) s.t. S is
opaque w.r.t. K† and Σa.
Proof This is an immediate consequence of Propositions 8 and 9. ⋄
Theorem 2 L(d †) is a regular language.
Proof This follows from the fact that A(d †) is an automaton with set of reachable states included
in the finite set Q× 2Q. ⋄
With Theorems 1 and 2, we have reached the objectives announced in sections 1 and 4. Namely,
the control f † induced by the automaton A† = A(d†) is the optimal control enforcing the opacity of
S on G, and this control is regular.
6 More on the Regularity of the Optimal Control
In Section 5, we have shown that the language K† = L(G/f †) of the optimal controller enforcing
the opacity of S on G is regular. This property was proved by constructing a finite automaton A†
accepting K†. We will now try to seize the fundamental reasons why K† is regular. In the first part
of the section, we prove from scratch that K† must be generated by an automaton with the set of
states Q× 2Q without constructing this automaton nor giving any regular expression of this language.
In the second part of the section, we add comments on the structural properties of the controller A†,
emerging from the results obtained in Section 5.
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6.1 Another Proof of the Regularity of K†
Let G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, QS) like in Section 5. For all q ∈ Q, let Lq(G) denote the language generated by
G from state q, thus L(G) = Lq0(G). We reasoned until now upon the family K of all non-empty and
prefix-closed sublanguages K of L(G) such that K is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and S is opaque w.r.t.
K and Σa. We will now replace K with a family H of maps h each of which defines a doubly indexed
collection of languages h(q,E) ⊆ Lq(G), such that K may be retrieved from H by fixing q = q0 and
E = {q0}.
Definition 11 Let H be the family of all (total) maps h : Q × 2Q → P(Σ∗) such that the following
conditions are satisfied for all (q,E) ∈ Q× 2Q :
1. h(q,E) is a prefix-closed and controllable subset of Lq(G),
2. (∀w ∈ h(q,E)) (∃q′ ∈ E) (∃w′ ∈ h(q′, E)) w ∼a w
′ ∧ δ(q′, w′) /∈ QS.
Note that it is not required from languages h(q,E) that they are non-empty nor that they are regular.
The set of maps H may be partially ordered by pointwise inclusion of maps. Thus, h ≤ h′ if h(q,E) ⊆
h′(q,E) for all q ∈ Q and E ∈ 2Q. Properties (1) and (2) stated for languages h(q,E) in Definition 11
are preserved under arbitrary unions of languages. Therefore, the set of maps H has a supremum h†.
From Definition 11, it follows easily thatK = {h(q0, {q0}) |h ∈ H} and therefore,K
† = h†(q0, {q0}).
Now let [w]†a = [w]a ∩ h
†(q0, {q0}) ∩Σ
∗Σa and define:
∆ : K† → Q× 2Q
w 7→
{
(δ(q0, w), {q0}) if w ∈ Σ
∗
ua
(δ(q0, w), δ(q0, [w]
†
a)) otherwise
We will show the commutativity of following diagram:
K†
r //
∆

r(K†)
Q× 2Q
h†
::
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
where r denotes the residuation function, that is to say r : w 7→ w−1K†. The commutativity of the
diagram entails obviously the regularity ofK† and explains the fundamental reasons why the algorithm
defined in Section 5 computes effectively this regular language.
The proof of the commutativity of the diagram (Theorem 3) relies on two more definitions and
lemmas.
Definition 12
Let h˜ : Q× 2Q → P(Σ∗)
(q,E) 7→ ∪ {w−1K† |w ∈ K† ∧ ∆(w) = (q,E)}
Lemma 4 h˜ ∈ H
Proof Let (q,E) ∈ Q × 2Q. If h˜(q,E) = ∅, then properties (1) and (2) are satisfied. Suppose that
h˜(q,E) 6= ∅. Then, h˜(q,E) is a union of prefix-closed and controllable sublanguages of Lq(G) which
implies property (1). Let now u ∈ h˜(q,E). Then wu ∈ K† for some w ∈ K† such that ∆(w) = (q,E).
There exists v ∈ K† such that v ∼a wu and δ(q0, v) 6∈ QS . If w ∈ Σ
∗
ua then E = {q0}, v ∼a u and
δ(q0, v) 6∈ QS . Otherwise, we can write v = w
′u′ with w′ ∈ [w]†a and u′ ∼a u. If we let q
′ = δ(q0, w
′)
then q′ ∈ E, u′ ∈ h˜(q′, E) and δ(q′, u′) = δ(q0, w
′u′) 6∈ QS which shows property (2). Therefore h˜ ∈ H.
⋄
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Definition 13
Let [[·]] : H → P(Σ∗)
h 7→ ∪ {w · h(q,E) |w ∈ K† ∧ ∆(w) = (q,E)}
Lemma 5 For all h ∈ H, [[h]] ∈ K.
Proof Let h ∈ H. We note first that K† ⊆ [[h]]. It is clear that [[h]] is a prefix-closed and controllable
sublanguage of L(G). Let u ∈ H, then u = wv with w ∈ K†, ∆(w) = (q,E) and v ∈ h(q,E). Because
h satisfies property (2), there must exist q′ ∈ E and u′ ∈ h(q′, E) such that u′ ∼a u and δ(q
′, E) 6∈ QS .
Also, there must exist w′ ∈ [w]†a such that δ(q0, w
′) = q′ by definition of ∆. So w′u′ ∼a wu and
δ(q0, w
′u′) = δ(q′, u′) 6∈ QS . Finally [[h]] ∈ K and [[h]] ⊆ K
†. ⋄
Theorem 3 Let w ∈ K† and ∆(w) = (q,E), then w−1K† = h†(q,E).
Proof Clearly, w−1K† ⊆ h˜(q,E) and h˜(q,E) ⊆ h†(q,E) since h˜ ∈ H. So w−1K† ⊆ h†(q,E). Also,
[[h†]] ⊆ K† since h† ∈ H and hence h†(q,E) ⊆ w−1K†. Therefore, w−1K† = h†(q,E). ⋄
6.2 Some Structural Properties of A†
To end the section, we would like to describe more precisely the structure of the automaton A†. The
set of reachable states of this automaton may be partitioned into disjoint subsets Q(E) such that
(q′, E′) ∈ Q(E) if and only if E = E′. For each E, the full restriction of A† induced on Q(E) is
isomorphic to a subautomaton of G, where the isomorphism maps (q, E)
σ
−→ (q′, E) to q
σ
−→ q′. The
automaton A† may therefore be seen as a mode automaton, with one mode per estimate E. In each
mode E, the automaton A† exerts state based control on G until, at some state (q,E), it enables some
action σ ∈ Σa which the adversary is aware of. Then A
† jumps to a new mode E′, reflecting the
new condensed estimate gained by the adversary, and it enters Q(E′) at (q′, E′) such that q
σ
−→ q′ in
G. In the technical terms of Section 5, the new mode is E′ = d†(E,E,Σ∗uaσ). Note finally that the
adversary’s view of G/f † is isomorphic to the quotient of A† obtained by removing first all transitions
with labels in Σua and then crushing Q(E) to a single state for each mode E.
7 Conclusion
Given a system modeled by a finite transition system G over Σ∗, a regular secret S ⊆ Σ∗ and an
adversary observing a subset Σa ⊆ Σ of the events of G, we have addressed the problem of computing
the supremal controller that enforces the opacity of S on G while observing and controlling respective
subsets Σo ⊆ Σ and Σc ⊆ Σo of events of G. Assuming that Σa ⊆ Σo, we have shown that this
supremal controller is regular. The question is open whether the supremal controller is still regular and
effectively computable when Σa and Σo are not comparable. The non-blocking property of supervisors
was ignored in this work. However, under full observation (i.e. when Σ = Σo), a straightforward
adaptation of our work suffices to enforce also the deadlock-freeness of the controlled system G/f †.
It suffices indeed to state in Definition 9 that φ(d)(q,E, σ) is undefined whenever σ ∈ Σc and some
deadlocked configuration can be reached from δd((q,E), σ) by some uncontrollable sequence of events
s ∈ Σ∗uc
7. Meanwhile, we believe that ensuring the deadlock-freeness of the controlled system is not
completely relevant when the main objective is to enforce security on a system that provides services,
since for instance the controlled system may remain trapped forever in an unobservable cycle with the
effect to deny further service from the standpoint of the user. On the other hand, requiring that any
7It is worth noting that the reduction from partial observation to total observation presented in Section 3 works for
opacity but does not work for deadlock-freeness.
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observed trace of the controlled system can always be extended by some observable action seems a bit
restrictive. In the context of web services for example, a system is often required to always answer
requests, but if all request have been served and no further request is made, it is not excluded that
the system stays forever performing unobservable actions, e.g. updating time counters and removing
information out of date. It would be interesting to capture, beside safety and opacity aspects, other
disponibility aspects that influence the quality of service of secure systems. Ideally, supervisory control
should enforce simultaneously safety, confidentiality, and disponibility.
Many applications in which security issues cannot be ignored deal with infinite data types. Such
systems or services are naturally modelled with infinite transition systems. In order to avoid that
confidential information leaks from such infinite systems, it seems important to investigate techniques
of opacity control under abtract interpretation, including regular abstractions as a particular case.
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